

**THE LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION: FACING THE
DILEMMA OF WARFIGHTING AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

**A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree**

**MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies**

by

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1999

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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

19990909 332

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302 and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 4 Jun 99		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis 7 Aug 98 - 4 Jun 99
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Light Infantry Battalion: Facing the Dilemma of Warfighting and Operations Other Than War			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Viet X. Luong				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave., Bldg. 111, Rm. 123 Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study examines how U.S. light infantry battalions transition from warfighting to operations other than war. Within the last several decades, U.S. forces have been actively involved in missions ranging from combat operations to operations other than war. The dilemma occurs when units must focus on warfighting tasks and at the same time be prepared to deploy worldwide into an uncertain operations other than war mission. Even though there are inherent similarities between combat operations and operations other than war, the latter expose leaders and soldiers to a unique set of challenges that combat training alone will not mitigate. The purpose of this study is to determine how U.S. light infantry battalions can effectively transition from warfighting to operations other than war. The author examines three light infantry battalions through Operation Restore Hope, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Operation Joint Endeavor. The study reveals that battle focused training, while one of the key factors in preparing units for combat and operations other than war, alone will not completely mitigate the challenges of the latter. The study recommends integration of staff and leader training in operations other than war into unit training cycles. Additionally, the study strongly recommends mission focused predeployment training for units deploying into operations other than war.				
14 SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 78	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE


Name of Candidate: Major Viet X. Luong

Thesis Title: The Light Infantry Battalion: Facing the Dilemma of Warfighting and Operations Other Than War


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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION: FACING THE DILEMMA OF WARFIGHTING AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by MAJ Viet X. Luong, USA, 78 pages.

This study examines how U.S. light infantry battalions transition from warfighting to operations other than war. Within the last several decades, U.S. forces have been actively involved in missions ranging from combat operations to operations other than war. The dilemma occurs when units must focus on warfighting tasks and at the same time be prepared to deploy worldwide into an uncertain operations other than war mission. Even though there are inherent similarities between combat operations and operations other than war, the latter expose leaders and soldiers to a unique set of challenges that combat training alone will not mitigate.

The purpose of this study is to determine how U.S. light infantry battalions can effectively transition from warfighting to operations other than war. The author examines three light infantry battalions through Operation Restore Hope, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Operation Joint Endeavor.

The study reveals that battle focused training, while one of the key factors in preparing units for combat and operations other than war, alone will not completely mitigate the challenges of the latter. The study recommends integration of staff and leader training in operations other than war into unit training cycles. Additionally, the study strongly recommends mission focused predeployment training for units deploying into operations other than war.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the sacrifices and encouragement of my wife, Kimberly, and my children, Ashley and Brandon. They truly empowered me with the motivation to complete this challenging project. I also want to acknowledge Mr. Rick Bogdan, LTC William Oriet, and Dr. Ken Plowman. These gentlemen spent countless hours deciphering several drafts of this thesis and providing me with candid feedback and guidance. Additionally, I want to acknowledge the following infantrymen who have volunteered their time to participate in the valuable interviews: BG Charles Swannack, COL Curtis Scaparrotti, LTC Richard Hooker, MAJ Malcolm Frost, MAJ Morris Goins, MAJ Bruce Stanley, and MAJ Randy White.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Report
ABCT	Airborne Battalion Combat Team
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CLF	Cortinian Liberation Front
CTC	Combat Training Center
EUCOM	European Command
FM	Field Manual
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
METL	Mission Essential Task List
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
OPFOR	Opposing Forces
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organizations
NTC	National Training Center
O/C	Observer/Controller
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
SME	Subject Matter Expert
STX	Situational Training Exercises

UN	United Nations
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USAIS	United States Army Infantry School

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Today's world, with changing patterns of conflict and threats to U.S. interests, presents new political and military challenges. It also presents extraordinary opportunities. The existence of instability and potential threats require a strong military capability sufficiently versatile to execute national military strategy across the full range of operations--to include war and operation other than war. (FM 100-23 1993, iv)

Operations other than war (OOTW) pose a significant challenge to U.S. conventional forces. This decade has produced new threats that require the application of military force in unique ways. The new battlefield is multidimensional with many significant challenges that are full of political, cultural, and environmental implications. For the conventional forces at the tip of the spear to execute these missions with short notice, the biggest challenge is how to effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW. The purpose of this paper is to answer how light infantry battalions can effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW. The nature of OOTW involves multiple facets ranging from civil affairs and psychological operations to a multitude of implications beyond the span of control of the infantry battalion. Hence, in order to narrow the scope of the research, this thesis primarily focuses on the warfighting tactical tasks the light infantry battalions typically perform and those tactical tasks that they must perform during OOTW.

The fall of the Berlin wall essentially marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. The end of this conflict brought significant shifts in military strategy and options. During this period, the U.S. Army transitioned from a forward-deployed force to force projection and reduced its active force to 480,000 troops. Naturally, with the diminishing

Soviet threat, force reduction made remarkable sense. Unfortunately, the changing world produced new threats to U.S. national interests that warrant military actions. The U.S. Army, significantly understrengthened, continued to perform missions around the world and maintained the same high operational tempo it had generated during the Cold War era. Unlike the Cold War era, the focus on military operation shifted to both warfighting and OOTW.

OOTW had been an inherent part of every military operation since the beginning of U.S. Army history. In the past, the Army's focus was on warfighting; hence, the Army's keystone doctrine minimally addressed OOTW. Recent experience, however, dictated the enlargement of the role of OOTW. Consequently, the early nineties witnessed the emergence of new OOTW doctrine. The Army keystone doctrinal manual Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, for the first time included a chapter on OOTW. The Army also released a new OOTW field manual, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, during the same period. These two manuals exemplified significant progress in U.S. Army doctrine and the relevance of OOTW in current and future conflicts.

From Harpers Ferry to Bosnia-Herzegovina, U.S. conventional forces had been instrumental in executing missions across the entire OOTW spectrum. These missions ranged from noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) to civil disturbance and disaster relief. The missions varied greatly in the level of complexity as well as scope and objectives. The only constant had been the role of the light infantry battalion in executing these OOTW missions.

During this decade, the light infantry battalion had been the force of choice in OOTW. Light infantry battalions are highly trained, rapidly deployable, and remarkably

flexible. Consequently, light infantry battalions, to include airborne and air assault battalions, took part in virtually every major OOTW mission since the turn of the decade. In 1991, following Operation Desert Storm, 3-325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team (ABCT) took part in Operation Provide Comfort to deter Iraqi aggression against ethnic Kurds in Northern Iraq. Shortly after the implementation of Operation Provide Comfort, the 10th Mountain Division took part in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. In 1994, the 10th Mountain Division participated in Operation Uphold Democracy to restore order to the Haiti Republic after the ousting of General Raoul Cedras. The 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain Division in Haiti and served as part of the multinational force mission in Haiti. Other light infantry units also participated in Operation Uphold Democracy United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). These units consisted of rifle companies from the 82d Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division.

In addition, light forces also participated in a wide range of OOTW missions. Units from the 82d Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division took part in Hurricane Andrew to assist the citizens of Dade County Florida during the aftermath of the hurricane. In December 1994, 2-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment deployed to Panama to reinforce Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) units during the Cuban refugee crisis. The main effort during the Cuban refugee crisis was the 5-87th Infantry, a light infantry battalion stationed in Panama. In December 1995, the 3-325th ABCT deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as the lead unit of Task Force Eagle during Operation Joint Endeavor. Several months later, the ABCT deployed to Rwanda to extract American citizens from harm's way.

The numerous deployments, coupled with superb mission execution, clearly demonstrated the agility of the U.S. Army light infantry battalions. As a result, the light infantry battalion remains as the force of choice for OOTW. Being the force of choice poses a significant challenge for the light infantry battalions. Primarily trained to fight wars, infantry battalions face the dilemma of maintaining warfighting focus and readiness while possessing the agility to operate in the OOTW spectrum. Unlike many armed forces of the world, the U.S. Army does not maintain a professional peacekeeping force. Instead, Army units expeditiously transition from warfighters to peacekeepers to meet worldwide demands. Countries like Canada and Romania maintain peacekeeping battalions, whose main focus is OOTW. There are multiple advantages as well as disadvantages of having professional peacekeeping battalions.

Without professional peacekeeping battalions, U.S. Army units must effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW. In order to undergo this metamorphosis, the light infantry battalion faces the dilemma of maintaining warfighting focus while preparing to face the uncertainty of OOTW.

The subject of preparation and training for OOTW is significantly important to the Army institution. The focus on OOTW emerged from series of operations from Grenada to Bosnia, to include Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Nevertheless, current OOTW missions remain uniquely challenging to present unit commanders as much as their predecessors in Panama and Somalia. The battlefield is complex, non-fluid, and full of political implications. But two distinct missions like Haiti and Bosnia have numerable similarities. The similarities when captured, analyzed, and converted into usable forms can serve as tremendous tools for future commanders. The task of converting a unit from

a conventional combat force into a peacekeeping force remains intensely difficult. Commanders, for the appropriate reasons, focus their units on warfighting. Hence, it is important to capture lessons learned and incorporate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) into appropriate sources for future use. OOTW will remain relevant in all future conflicts. OOTW has consistently been part of every military operation. In the past, many commanders merely treated it as a condition of the battlefield. Recent operations, however, determined the significance of OOTW and forged the way for the incorporation of OOTW into U.S. Army doctrine.

The Primary Research Question and Subordinate Questions

The primary research question is How can U.S. light infantry battalions effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW? Unlike several foreign armed forces currently performing global missions in the OOTW spectrum, the U.S. Army conventional forces do not consist of specialized units trained solely to operate in the OOTW environment. Instead U.S. forces focus primarily on warfighting skills to maintain the appropriate level of proficiency. OOTW, although a relatively new doctrinal terminology, has been an inherent part of war since early times. Unfortunately, especially for those who are called upon to perform these missions, there is a limited amount of written doctrine that coherently addresses sustained training and preparation for units destined to perform in OOTW missions. As a result, the ability to effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW remains as the number one challenge for commanders at all levels.

The primary research question triggers a series of inherent subordinate questions. The most significant subordinate question is Do U.S. Army conventional forces need to

train OOTW tasks in addition to wartime tasks? One can strongly argue for the incorporation of OOTW tasks into the units' normal training regiment. Units like the 82d Airborne Division consistently trains NEO along with wartime tasks such as conduct airborne assault/airfield seizure. Other units do not train OOTW tasks at all. The counterargument for not training OOTW tasks is equally as sound. Training units to required proficiency in wartime tasks is challenging enough for most commanders. Incorporation of OOTW tasks can possibly detract from warfighting focus.

This question also creates several tertiary questions. The incorporation of OOTW tasks into the regular training regiment raises the following questions: How much and at what level do units need to train OOTW tasks? and does the U.S Army current training cycle facilitate the incorporation of OOTW tasks?

Another secondary question is how do units prepare to perform OOTW? In the cases of the 2d ACR in Haiti and the 1st Cavalry Division in Bosnia, the units conducted both individual readiness training (IRT) and a mission rehearsal exercise prior to deployment. But in several cases, to include the 82d Airborne during Grenada and Panama (Operation Just Cause), the 2-505th Parachute Infantry and 2d Ranger Battalion in Panama during the Cuban refugee crisis in 1994, units do not have the luxury of conducting OOTW specific training prior to executing the mission. The most prominent fact coming out of these examples is that units should be prepared to execute OOTW tasks without additional training.

Another controversial question is, does the U.S. Army need a professional peacekeeping force? This question brings about heated discussions in whether the U.S. Army can feasibly field a professional specialized peacekeeping force, whose main focus

is OOTW. There are numerous advantages and disadvantages to having a professional peacekeeping force. Some of the obvious advantages are proficiency and continuity. Additionally, the peacekeeping units can focus on peacekeeping to allow other units to focus on warfighting. Many people, to include the controversial Colonel David Hackworth, argued against sending one of the Army's premiere warfighting divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, to Bosnia. But based on the dwindling Army, there are few other options. Hence, the option of a professional peacekeeping force still exists as a valid course of action.

Definitions

Operations Other Than War (OOTW). According to FM 100-5, *Operations*, OOTW include, but are not limited to the following: noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids. The research author also included stability operations in this list.

Peace Operations. In accordance with FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, peace operations consist of three types of activities: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Support to Diplomacy. Components include peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy. Support to diplomacy takes place in peace or in conflict and is conducted to prevent conflict. Military actions contribute to and are subordinate to the peacemaking process (FM 100-23 1993, 2).

Peacekeepers. The author loosely used the term peacekeeping and peacekeepers to refer to soldiers performing OOTW missions. According to FM 100-5, *Operations*, peacekeeping is “operations supporting diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilize conflict between two belligerent nations and, as such, require the consent of both parties involved in the dispute.”

Peace Enforcement. Peace Enforcement is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

Delimitations

The narrow focus on the light infantry battalion is the primary delimitation of this research. The majority of OOTW missions consisted of division and brigade size forces. However, a research thesis focusing on the brigade or division level is simply unmanageable because of the massive task organization that would require research into the realms of civil affairs, psychological operations, information operations, and a myriad of other areas. The scope of this research is also limited to a specific type of unit. Other conventional forces, including military police, armor, and light cavalry battalions have performed superbly in OOTW missions. Additionally, forces from various nations had participated in multinational, NATO, as well as United Nations OOTW missions. The author's intent is to look at other information available on OOTW that would assist in the preparation of the thesis including case studies of multinational and United Nations

missions; however, the focus of the research remains the U.S. Army light infantry battalion.

The second delimitation is the time frame of the case studies. The author made a conscious decision to narrow the time frame of his research to the present decade. During this decade the U.S. Army has been involved in numerous OOTW missions. The case studies emanating from these missions alone provide substantial information for research. Additionally, this decade marks the emergence of coherent U.S. Army OOTW doctrine.

The third delimitation is the author's own OOTW experience. As a rifle company commander in the 82d Airborne Division, the author deployed to Haiti as part of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Additionally, he had served two years at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) as an observer/controller (O/C). His JRTC experience includes two mission rehearsal exercises for Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia and a Partnership for Peace exercise. The author's own experience is a major influencing factor in the analysis of the data. On the other hand, the author's experience level also provides the ability for quality analysis.

The fourth delimitation is the sole use of unclassified sources. The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) archives contain a multitude of classified information on Operation Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy. Again, the use of classified materials would make the project unmanageable.

Assumptions

The author made two assumptions for this research project. First, he assumed that the units involved in the case studies were trained in their basic warfighting tasks. The second assumption was the parity of units' warfighting proficiency.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to examine relevant literature and existing doctrine. The nineties witnessed a cosmic emergence of OOTW doctrine and literature. For the first time FM 100-5, *Operations*, the Army keystone doctrinal manual, dedicated a chapter on OOTW. In the same year, the Army published FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. The publication of these two key field manuals, attested to the emerging importance of OOTW. While these manuals came too late for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, they served as valuable references for commanders in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia.

This decade also experienced peaking interest in OOTW. Students of Army staff colleges began researching and writing on OOTW. Naturally, the Army's heavy involvement in OOTW during this decade, spanning between Operation Provide Comfort to the present mission in Bosnia, produced a generation of officers with substantial experience in this arena. Additionally, OOTW is a controversial subject. OOTW deployments have had severe impact on the combat readiness of Army units. Consequently, staff college students in the past have done extensive research on the subject because of its future implication on readiness and training.

The CARL of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has a rich collection of papers that address OOTW and its implications. The CARL archives contain a collection of the 10th Mountain Division Operation Restore Hope After Action Report and the 25th Infantry Division Operation Uphold Democracy After Action Report. In addition to the luxury of the CARL, the Center of Army Lessons Learned (CALL),

also located on Fort Leavenworth, has a magnificent collection of after action reports (AARs); lessons learned; vignettes; and OOTW tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The 10th Mountain Division Final After Action Report for Operation Restore Hope located in the CARL archives contains invaluable lessons learned for future operations. This AAR covers the operation in phases to include planning, preparation, deployment, execution, and redeployment. The AAR breaks down the lessons learned by the seven battlefield operating systems (BOS).

One of the most revealing conclusions made by Major General Arnold, the 10th Mountain Division and ARFOR Commander during Restore Hope relates to training and preparation for OOTW. He stated the following in his introduction: "Operation Other Than War may become a large part of the future of our Army, but the realistic combat training we now conduct prepared us well for this operation and should provide well for what ever the future brings" (10th Mountain Division 1993, i).

Key deductions from the Maneuver BOS support Major General Arnold's conclusions. Maneuver commanders found that while different missions varied in METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, time, and troops available), maneuver units during Operation Restore Hope generally performed tasks that they routinely train to execute. An example of the tasks that infantry units performed during Operation Restore Hope include air assault, cordon and search, search and attack, and establish checkpoints and roadblocks. Additionally, units conducted fixed site security on airfields and ports and provided convoy security escort. These tasks are inherent supporting tasks to most light infantry battalion mission essential tasks list (METL). Light infantry units routinely

perform all or the majority of these tasks during a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, the combat training center for light forces in the continental United States.

Other lessons learned from the Maneuver BOS also supported MG Arnold's conclusions. The following is an excerpt from the Maneuver section of the 10th Mountain Division Restore Hope After Action Report:

Success in most of our operations was due to the training of squads, platoons, and companies, since most operations focused at that level. Most engagements occurred at under 25 meters and many were at night. Battle drills, situational training exercises, weapons and night vision devices zeroing, and training to fire and maneuver with flak vests and helmets, were absolutely critical basic skills to the survival of units in this environment. (10th Mountain Division 1993, 7)

Again, the battle drills the excerpt above mentions are the eight basic battle drills that light infantry platoons and squads consistently train, while zeroing individual weapons, operate night vision devices, and move as a member of a fireteam are all Skill Level I individual tasks.

Another historical document of great value is the 25th Infantry Division Operation Uphold Democracy After Action Report. This after action report follows the same layout as the 10th Mountain's report and includes the unit's transition from a U.S. to a multinational operation. The environment in Haiti was markedly different from Somalia and the threat significantly less.

A key lesson learned calls for division directed and resourced situational training exercises (STXs). These STXs consist of fixed site security, cordon and search, dismounted patrol, convoy operations, and quick reaction force (QRF) employment. The collective tasks outlined in the STXs are remarkably similar to the 10th Mountain's tasks. Platoon, squads, and individual supporting tasks to dismounted patrolling and QRF employment generally include the eight basic battle drills, firing individual weapons,

operate night vision devices, and move as a member of a fireteam. Another key lesson learned calls for the integration of government organizations, host nation organizations, and non-government organizations into the planning process. The Combat Maneuver Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center have effectively integrated these organizations into rotational scenario. Essentially, light infantry battalions rotating through these training centers benefit from the integration.

The other source of great value to this thesis is the research papers that currently exist. One of the most thorough documents is RAND's *Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness*. The paper focuses on the effects of peace operations on U.S. Army readiness. The paper outlined several key findings. The most obvious and devastating is deployments reduce units' major theater war (MTW) readiness. It also found that deployment and not pre-deployment training contributed to diminishing MTW readiness (RAND, X). This finding, however, is difficult to quantify since Army units generally do not focus training on OOTW. Instead trainers, in the case of the combat training centers, integrates the OOTW environment into training scenario.

Another key finding of the RAND paper provides mitigation measures to leverage the effects of deployments on combat readiness. Measures includes greater dependency on other agencies to perform OOTW missions, leader training, unit training during deployment, and establishing single set of equipment for the entire rotation (RAND, XI). Since the publishing of this paper, units in the Bosnia Theater are exercising some of the mitigation measures. Mechanized infantry units continue to maintain Bradley gunnery proficiency in theater.

In addition to the RAND paper, there are several individual theses and monographs in the CARL archives that address OOTW and relevant issues. Major Christopher Rizzo's "War or Operations Other Than War: The Light Force Leader's Training Dilemma" is a monograph that outlines a key and controversial issue: Should light conventional forces train for OOTW in addition to wartime tasks? The scope of this study spanned over a period of thirty years, beginning with the 82d Airborne Division during Operation Power Pack in the Dominican Republic in 1965, to the present. The author concludes at the end of the study "the separation of OOTW tasks from their warfighting doctrine fails to capture the fluid environment of historical operations. The historical shift from combat to stability operations, or vice versa, often frustrates soldiers and finds their leaders unprepared" (Rizzo 1997, iii). The monograph recommends the inclusion of OOTW tasks into training manuals so light forces can develop training plans that prepare soldiers for both combat and OOTW tasks (Rizzo 1997, 43). The monograph does not outline convincing arguments for training OOTW tasks. Units deploying to Bosnia now are not training OOTW. Instead, units undergo mission specific mission rehearsal exercises and individual readiness training prior to deployment. Furthermore, the author makes no recommendation on how much and at what level should training be incorporated.

At the other end of the spectrum is Major David Bongi's monograph, "Preparing For Peacekeeping Operations Through Battle Focused Training." This monograph presents an interesting view. In this study, the author concludes "Battle focused training can prepare a light infantry organization for the majority of military type tasks necessary to execute a peacekeeping force operation without detracting significantly from their

warfighting focus" (Bongi 1994, iii). The author makes some great assertions about the ability to transition forces rapidly from warfighters to peacekeepers with battle focused training. A fact worth noting is the author completed this study prior to U.S involvement in Haiti and Bosnia. Nevertheless, Bongi was able to articulate the redundancy between wartime and OOTW tasks in his analysis. In his analysis, Bongi concluded that approximately seventy percent of OOTW tasks are redundant wartime tasks (Bongi 1994, 43). He also acknowledged that there are tasks that require specific training apart from wartime tasks (Bongi 1994, 39).

In order to examine the significance of OOTW training, it is necessary to examine the U.S. Army's FM 100-5, *Operations*. The introduction to this manual states "As the Army keystone doctrine, FM 100-5 describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations." This includes the conduct of operations other than war, but the major focus remains warfighting and how to achieve decisive victory. Chapter 13 of the manual covers the principles and tenets that govern the conduct of operations other than war. The presence of chapter 13, and inclusion of operations other than war, is a giant leap from previous editions.

The key leap in OOTW doctrine lies in the establishment of principles of OOTW in FM 100-5. The manual lists six principles: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. The understanding of the objective is remarkably important. Like war, a thorough understanding of the key tasks and endstate in the commander's intent allows soldiers to effectively function even in the absence of order. The second principle is unity of effort. The OOTW environment is fluid and complex. Other factors influencing military operations consist of economic, psychological, and

political. Hence, civilian, government, and military organization must maintain a mutual cooperative spirit in attaining common goals. The third principle is legitimacy.

FM 100-5 states that “sustain the willing acceptance by the people and right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.” In order to be successful, forces must perform in manner that does not detract from the legitimacy or effectiveness of the host nation government. The next two principles are perseverance and restraint. This is accepting the fact that OOTW may be prolonged due to the nature of the strategic aims and that decisive military victory is not always the solution, especially when it is not nested within the strategic aims. The last principle is security. This principle is inherent to every operation. Regardless of the perceived threat level, units should take appropriate force protection measures. While FM 100-5 does not provide details in the execution of OOTW, it provides the framework and guideline upon which units can build on.

FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, and Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War*, effectively fill the detail gap lacking in FM 100-5. FM 100-23 and Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 complement each other well. Both manuals talk extensively about the different types of OOTW missions and planning considerations. Like FM 100-23, JP 3-07 includes a chapter on the principles of OOTW. JP 3-07, however, has greater details in the additional portion of “Principles in Action.” In this portion, JP 3-07 uses examples of actual historical vignettes to illustrate the application of the principles.

These manuals also cover OOTW training. FM 100-23 contains an entire appendix on training. The appendix specifically lists specific tasks to be trained for

peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, like FM 100-5, the following passage reasserts that warfighting skills should still be the focus:

Training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. The first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills. Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission essential task list. However, units selected for these duties require time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks that may be different from their wartime METL. The amount of training required and when the training is given will depend on the particular peace operation mission. However, the philosophy used to determine the how much and when training questions for operations other than war can be summed up as just enough and just in time. (FM 100-23 1993, 86)

Joint Publication 3-07 echoes FM 100-23 on training for war. This publication, however, also stresses the importance of leader training and professional development to enhance units' performance in the challenging environment of OOTW.

A review of selected existing doctrine reveals that in the last few years the U.S. Army has done significant work to close the OOTW doctrinal void. The recurring theme throughout existing doctrine maintains that the primary focus for the U.S. Army is warfighting. FM 100-23 states that OOTW tasks should not be included in unit's mission essential task list (METL). It argues that units can effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW by maintaining battle focused training.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research method supporting this study consisted of detailed case studies, literature review, and on-hand sources to include CALL publications, units and training center after-action reviews, and interviews with leaders who have participated in OOTW missions. Supporting data for the study also encompassed the author's experience and observations as a participant in the planning, training, deployment, and execution of Operation Uphold Democracy as a rifle company commander. In addition, supporting data included observations and notes the author compiled while serving as a Senior Rifle Company O/C at the JRTC. His JRTC experience consisted of twenty rotations, Partnership for Peace 97, and 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment's mission rehearsal exercise for Bosnia.

Since the scope of the study involved the light infantry battalion, this thesis primarily focused on Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All three operations involved light infantry battalions and spanned across the spectrum of OOTW, encompassing peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and stability operations. The 10th Mountain Division participated in both Operation Restore Hope and Operation Uphold Democracy. During Operation Uphold Democracy, the 10th Mountain Division conducted a relief in place with its relieving unit, the 25th Infantry Division. Having two units participating in the same operation, gave the author the opportunity to perform a crosswise comparison of units' effectiveness. Additionally, the selection of the 10th Mountain Division for this study allowed the author to examine the same unit through

two distinct OOTW missions. The selection of the 3-325th ABCT's participation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a case study allowed the inclusion of current operations into the research project.

In addition, Operation Uphold Democracy, Joint Endeavor, and Restore Hope occurred during a critical period that witnessed the emergence of OOTW doctrine. The birth of FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, and the incorporation of an OOTW chapter in FM 100-5, *Operations*, occurred between the execution of these operations. Hence, the timing of these operations allowed the researcher to evaluate, from the available data, whether the current Army OOTW doctrine is relevant.

Units after action reports (AARs) were the most pertinent source of information. The author's access to the rich historical archives at the college's Combined Arms Research Library enhanced the quality of the research. The archives contained actual AARs from the 10th Mountain Division and 25th Infantry Division from Operation Restore Hope and Operation Uphold Democracy respectively. The accuracy of the data, therefore, was unquestionable because it came directly from the actual participants. The AARs provided the author with the foundation to expand the research to applicable sources. The archives; however, lacked information on 3-325th ABCT during Operation Joint Endeavor. Fortunately, the author was able to establish contact with COL Curtis Scaparrotti, then commander of 3-325th ABCT during Operation Joint Endeavor, and gained tremendous insight on the mission through personal interactions.

In answering the primary thesis question, the author examined other applicable sources. Again, the information was available through the college's archives. One of these sources was the units' training plan prior to mission execution. The author

examined the units' individual readiness training plan and collective training plan for these operations. The training plan provided data necessary in the study. This data allowed the author the tool to compare these units' normal wartime tasks to tasks required by OOTW operations. The difference between the two task lists formed the additional OOTW task list that units trained prior to deployment. Next, the author studied the units' training methodology. The important factor was to determine how the units trained warfighters to be peacekeepers. The true measure of success was how well these units performed their missions during the execution phase of Operations Restore Hope, Uphold Democracy, and Joint Endeavor. Consequently, this data proved invaluable in analyzing the training required to effectively transition the light infantry battalions into OOTW operations.

The next source of information the author researched was the applicable doctrine available. The key doctrinal manuals the author researched included FM 100-5, *Operations*; FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*; FM 25-100 and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*. These doctrinal manuals armed the author with information on how the U.S. Army conducts OOTW. FM 25-100 and 25-101 provided the author training models and strategies. The manuals focused the author on how the Army trains. These manuals provided the information necessary in determining whether the normal training cycle facilitates the training of additional OOTW tasks.

Another source of information the author researched was existing works on relevant topics. Related works included MMAS theses, War College papers, and SAMS monographs. These published documents provided the author with insight on related issues. In addition, the documents contained a tremendous amount of facts and served as

a linkage to other information channels that other authors have so meticulously researched. The author also reviewed periodicals containing OOTW articles. The *Military Review* offered works of significant insight. Like the college papers, these articles provided information resulting from thorough research and experience.

Perhaps one of the best sources of information was the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Available on the Internet, CALL products were available for both Operation Uphold Democracy and Operation Restore Hope. The products included tactics, techniques, and procedures; lessons learned; trends; and training recommendations. The scope of CALL products extended beyond Restore Hope, Uphold Democracy, and Joint Endeavor. The products contained facts on current operations in Bosnia. In addition, CALL provided the medium for recording combat training centers (CTCs) trends, which serve as one of the best training tools for units Army wide. CALL provided the author with both historical facts and issues impacting current operations. Thus, the utility of CALL was instrumental in analyzing whether the OOTW battlefield and the problems leaders and soldiers face significantly changed from the time of Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy to present operations in Bosnia.

The archives of the JRTC provided valuable information for the research. The Archives contained scenarios, operation orders, laydown packets, after-action reviews, and take-home packets for every unit that have rotated through the center. Although the 25th Infantry Division and the 10th Mountain Division did not conduct a mission rehearsal exercise at JRTC, other units to include the 1st Cavalry Division and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, participated in mission rehearsal exercises prior to deploying to Bosnia. Since none of these units trained OOTW tasks prior to deployment, the JRTC

mission exercises data couple with execution of the actual missions in Bosnia provided the author with information on whether units could effectively transition from warfighting to peacekeeping without training OOTW METL.

The faculty at the Command and General Staff College also provided information and assistance significant to the research. The Department of Joint and Multinational Operations (DJMO) and Combat Studies Institute (CSI) contained many experts who have completed extended research and published papers on OOTW. The other luxury that the college provided was access to various participants, most of whom were students of the resident CGSC. Frequent interface with the faculty and participants provided the author additional information that was not available elsewhere.

To augment the data, the author conducted interviews with participants who had led infantry units during these three operations. Interview population primarily consisted of the author's peers at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, who had served as company commanders during these operations, but also included Brigadier General Charles Swannack and Colonel Curtis Scaparrotti, who were brigade and battalion commanders during Operation Uphold Democracy and Joint Endeavor respectively. The interviews gave the author valuable insight into these operations that otherwise could not be obtained elsewhere.

The author organized the information gathered from the above sources into a database. He divided the information into the seven battlefield operating systems (BOS). With this information, the author conducted thorough analysis and determined units' effectiveness using the six principles of OOTW. The six Principles of OOTW are objective, security, restraint, perseverance, unity of effort, and legitimacy.

Since assessing units' success is extremely difficult in OOTW. For this study the author used his experience and conducted a qualitative analysis of units' effectiveness. He concluded, prior to the research that the answers to the research questions could not be solved purely by mathematics. Experience foremost, backed by evidence and facts gathered during the research process, assisted the author in determining how a light infantry battalion effectively transitions from warfighting to OOTW. The author developed several charts to evaluate and compare units' effectiveness during the three selected operations. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the model that the author used during the process.

Table 1. Analysis Matrix

PRINCIPLES OF OOTW	ANALYSIS	DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS
OBJECTIVE		Effective or Ineffective
SECURITY		
LEGITIMACY		
RESTRAINT		
UNITY OF EFFORT		
PERSEVERENCE		

Table 2. Comparison Matrix

PRINCIPLES OF OOTW	OPERATION RESTORE HOPE 10th MTN	OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 10th MTN	OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 25th ID	OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR 3-325th ABCT
OBJECTIVE				
SECURITY				
LEGITIMACY				
RESTRAINT				
UNITY OF EFFORT				
PERSEVERENCE				

After assessing and comparing the units' effectiveness during these operations, the author analyzed units' METL training and predeployment training. By forming a correlation between effectiveness and METL training and predeployment training, the author was able to determine possible solutions to the research questions.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter examines three case studies involving U.S. light infantry battalions. The purpose of this examination is to answer the primary research question "How can U.S. light infantry battalions effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW?" The chapter encompasses three operations in the present decade: Operation Restore Hope, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Operation Joint Endeavor. These operations cover a broad spectrum of OOTW to include humanitarian assistance operation, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping. All three operations involved U.S. light infantry battalions and cover a crucial period that witnessed emerging OOTW doctrine to the present operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The study primarily focuses on the preparation and mission execution various units. The author follows the 10th Mountain Division through both Operation Restore Hope and Operation Uphold Democracy. The author also looks at the 10th Mountain's replacement in Haiti, the 25th Infantry Division. Finally, the author examines the 3-325th ABCT during Operation Joint Endeavor. The author's intent is to draw analogies and trends from the case studies, interviews, unit after action reviews, and available sources and use qualitative analysis to determine the most effective way for light infantry battalions to transition from warfighting to OOTW.

In analyzing the case studies, the author aims to employ the principles of OOTW as a measuring tool to determine unit effectiveness. The author also examines unit training and preparation for these operations. Using the units' wartime METL, the author

compares the units' wartime training focus prior to deployment against execution. Next, he examines units' predeployment training and preparation. The author's intent is to determine the possible linkage between highly successful execution and peacetime preparation and focused predeployment training.

Operation Restore Hope

In November 1993, the 10th Mountain Division received a warning order from 18th Airborne Corps to begin planning for a probable mission to Somalia (10th Mountain Division 1993, 1). Somalia was amidst a violent Civil war. Without a legitimate government or infrastructure, couple with frequent factional fighting, Somalia was essentially a failed state. Like most failed states during a civil war, the people of Somalia suffered unimaginable hardship and despair. Thousands were dying as militant bandits prevented humanitarian relief convoys from getting to distribution centers.

Five major clans with more than twenty-one subclans were all fighting for control of what they thought belonged to them (10th Mountain Division 1993, 19). Bandits and warlords controlled the major lines of communications, making relief effort arduous and potentially deadly. Extortion of relief convoys was rampant. Extortionists either demanded a share of the relief supplies or cash payment by the relief agencies. Weapons from small arms to machine-guns and rocket propelled grenades were seemingly everywhere. Additionally, minefields were abundant throughout the country, emplaced without regards to friends or foes. Consequently, relief supplies were not getting to the most famined areas. As a result, the United Nations adopted UN security Resolution 794, giving U.S. forces "all necessary means" to ensure the constant flow of humanitarian relief supplies.

On 3 December 1992, the 10th Mountain Division received designation as the ARFOR (Army forces) headquarters for Operation Restore Hope. The division's broad mission was to perform operations in support of UN security Resolution 794. All units in the division began preparing soldiers and equipment for the deployment. The scope of the training evolved around situational training exercises, based on the rules of engagement as they became available. In addition, units immediately conducted country orientation to familiarize soldiers with the people, culture, history, and conflict of Somalia (10th Mountain Division 1993, 1).

While units were preparing to deploy to Somalia, the division staff faced the challenging task of defining the mission for Somalia. After several iterations of changes coupled with new guidance, the staff determined that the ARFOR's mission was to secure the Baledogle Airfield and other key installations to provide security for operations in support of relief distribution site and facilitate the safe passage of relief supplies (10th Mountain Division 1993, 18). With that mission statement, the lead maneuver units of the division began deployment to Somalia on 11 December 1992.

The first ARFOR maneuver unit to deploy to Somalia was elements of Task Force 2-87 IN. The battalion task force formed the core of the Commando Brigade, the 2d Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division. The battalion's mission was to conduct airland at Baledogle Airfield and perform relief in place with an element from the MARFOR. Upon completion of the relief in place, the battalion was to expand the airhead line and continue operations in zone.

The other U.S. light infantry battalion task force involved in the operation was Task Force 3-14 IN. On 20 December 1992, the Task Force was to deploy to Baledogle

Airfield to reinforce Task Force 2-87 IN. Due to the changing tactical situation on the ground, the Joint Task Force (JTF) diverted Task Force 3-14 IN to Kismayo Airfield. The task force's mission was to secure Kismayo Airfield and conduct operations in the vicinity of Kismayo. On 24 December 1992, the 1st Belgian Parachute Battalion joined Task Force 3-14 IN, and together they formed the core of Task Force Kismayo. Brigadier General Magruder, the 10th Mountain Division Assistant Division Commander for Operations, took command of the combined task force. For the next several months the infantry task forces, along with multinational units, conducted operations throughout Somalia in support of UN security Council Resolution 794 (10th Mountain Division 1993, 19).

The JTF initially divided the area of operation into eight humanitarian relief sectors, to include Mogadishu, Baledogle, Gialalassi, Baidoa, Kismayo, Bardera, Belet Uen, and Oddur. A brigade commander was responsible for each humanitarian relief sector (10th Mountain Division 1993, 20). Upon arrival in an area of operation, the units conduct missions in accordance with the UNITAF "standard operation." The standard operation consisted of five phases:

Phase I. Ambassador Oakley or his designated representative informs the village elders and clan leaders that coalition forces will be coming into the area under peaceful terms to facilitate relief operations. The time of the units' arrival is not announced.

Phase II. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) forces begin distributing leaflets announcing the arrival of coalition forces into sector. The messages also urge the local population and bandits to put away their weapons.

Phase III. Maneuver forces arrive in sector with complement of slice and support units. Units escort relief convoys in with the initial insertion. Once in sector, units perform relief convoy escort operations and patrolling to enforce theater weapons control policy.

Phase IV. This phase occurs upon successful mission execution. The scope of phase IV is to stress the peaceful nature of the campaign.

Phase V. This phase includes the redeployment of forces to basecamps or the introduction of forces into another area of operation (10th Mountain Division 1993, 22).

Following this model, coalition forces began Phase III Operations on 28 December 1992. While Task Force 3-14 IN was conducting security operations, Task Force 2-87 IN received the first major mission. The task force's mission was to perform an air assault into Marka to support humanitarian assistance operation. The situation in Marka was near hopeless for relief agencies when corrupted clan leaders and bandits prevented relief supply convoys from reaching the most severe areas. In response to the crisis, Task Force 2-87 IN conducted a battalion air assault into Marka to seize the port to establish a base of operation. The task force immediately linked up with the humanitarian ground convoy in Shalaamboot and escorted the convoy to Qoryooley. Task Force 3-14 IN achieved great success in January 1993, seizing a large weapon cache in Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS) Marka. During this month, the task force conducted patrolling and cordon and search operation to enforce the weapons control policy. These operations encompassed the towns of Kurtunwaarey, Baraawe, and Qoryooley and lasted throughout January (10th Mountain Division, 1993, 22).

On 31 January 1993, the task force's focus shifted to Afgooye. The battalion task force conducted an air assault to eliminate banditry at the key crossroad. Along with 984th MP Company and 3-17th Cavalry Squadron, the task force occupied sectors and conducted cordon and search operations immediately in the Afgooye area. After several days, the task force significantly reduced banditry in the area. Upon successfully completing its mission, Task Force 2-87 IN redeployed to its basecamp, leaving the 984th MP Company as a stabilization force for Afgooye (10th Mountain Division 1993, 22).

On 25 February 1993, Task Force 2-87 conducted a battalion air assault into Kismayo. The task force's mission was to provide a show of force and conduct security and disarmament operations in Kismayo. The task force conducted patrolling and cordon and search throughout the 27th and 28th. Again, upon successful mission accomplishment, the battalion redeployed to basecamp, leaving the 984th MP Company in place to provide security for the humanitarian assistance compound in the area (10th Mountain Division 1993, 24).

Elsewhere in theater, Task Force 3-14 IN achieved similar success. On 12 January 1993, the task force conducted an air assault to seize Jilib. This town spanned a key crossroad that linked Kismayo and Mogadishu. Hence, the town was key terrain to humanitarian relief agencies. The task force secured the Jilib and established a base of operation south of the town. On 20 January, the task force received humanitarian relief supplies via airdrop (10th Mountain Division, 1993, 24). The task force continued similar operations though the entire duration of Operation Restore Hope.

The 10th Mountain Division forces began redeployment in March 1993. During three months of operation in Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division effectively established

ideal conditions to bolster humanitarian relief efforts. The division successfully performed more than 2,000 convoy escort missions. This effort enabled humanitarian relief agencies to distribute over 15,000 tons of relief supplies to the most devastated areas of Somalia (10th Mountain Division, 1993, 25). By late January, humanitarian agencies in Somalia declared the end to the food shortage crisis. As a result, humanitarian focus shifted from purely food distribution to encompass improving Somalia's hopelessly degraded infrastructure. On 15 March 1993, the multinational forces relieved the division in sector under the UN mandate authorizing the creation UNISOM II.

Operation Uphold Democracy

In September 1994, the crisis in Haiti had reached the boiling point. Three years earlier the legitimate regime of Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide capitulated after a successful coup attempt led by the Haitian Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. Over the next few years, the Cedras Junta government viciously suppressed opposition leaders to exercise its brutal agenda. A series of murder and assassination followed which sent a clear message to both the Haitian and international community that the Junta was in power and would do anything to retain its prestige. The regime led Haiti down a destructive path that crippled Haitian economy and degenerated its infrastructure. The turmoil forced thousands of Haitians to gamble their lives away at sea in flimsy crafts in hope of a better life in the United States.

The Haitian refugee crisis led President Clinton, in March 1993, to publicly support the restoration of President Aristide to power. Intense international diplomatic and political pressure, coupled with an oil embargo, convinced Cedras to agree to

abdicate power no later than April 1993 in exchange for the safety of his family and staff. President Aristide also agreed to the terms while in exile. Unfortunately, when UN negotiator, Dante Caputo, arrived in Port-au-Prince to work the details of the power transfer, the Junta fiercely resisted. The Junta was apparently certain that U.S. armed intervention was possible but unlikely. Consequently, on 16 June 1993, the United Nations Security Council voted to freeze financial assets of powerful Haitians and simultaneously impose a ban on petroleum sales to Haiti. The international sanctions were under the premises of United Nations security Resolution (UNSCR) 841 (Kretchik 1998, 34).

Succumbing to international pressure, Cedras agreed to sign the Governors Island Agreement on 3 July 1993. The general initiatives of the agreement entailed the resignation of Cedras and his henchmen and the restoration of President Aristide to power. Additionally, the UN was to lift economic sanctions imposed under UNSCR 841. Most importantly, however, was the initiative to allow UN military forces and civilian police (CIVPOL) to enter Haiti to assist in the rebuilding of Haiti's decrepit infrastructure (Kretchik 1998, 34).

In response to the initiatives of the Governors Island agreement, U.S. forces created the Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF HAG) to initiate the planning for introduction of UN military forces and CIVPOL. While planning was taking place at the JTF HAG Headquarters, Haiti plummeted into yet another reign of terror. The Junta Government covertly sponsored a series of political assassinations. As a result, on 23 September 1993, the UN security Council authorized the implementation of the

Governors Island Agreement, in which 1267 military and CIVPOL personnel were to deploy to Haiti (Kretchik 1993, 36).

On 11 October 1993, a portion of JTF HAG arrived in Port-au-Prince aboard the U.S.S Harlan County. Joint task force personnel met Haitian resistance that precluded the force from landing at the port. During the same night, U.S. personnel aboard the U.S.S Harlan County observed the Haitians moving two V-150 Armored Personnel vehicles into position. The permissive entry operation of JTF HAG, authorized by the Governors Island Agreement, had turned into a volatile situation. Several days passed, and the situation intensified as Haitian gunboats maneuvered within 2,500 yards from the Harlan County. Concerned for the safety of his crew and the vessel, the Captain of the U.S.S Harlan weighed anchor and steamed back to Guantanamo Bay (Kretchik 1998, 41). The Harlan County incident and continued government sponsored killings led the United Nations to impose a naval blockade on Haiti in October 1993. The crisis had now escalated to the point where the only resolute course of action was an armed intervention by forced entry operation.

By 1994, the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) and the subordinate XVIIIth Airborne Corps began finalizing the Haiti invasion plan coded OPLAN 2370. The plan called for a forced entry invasion by the Joint Special Operation Task Force (JSOTF) and the 82d Airborne Division. Planners later added a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to the plan (Kretchik 1998, 45). In May 1994, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed USACOM to develop an additional plan for permissive entry. The plan that evolved was OPLAN 2380. The 10th Mountain Division formed the core of the troop list for OPLAN 2380. By September 1994, the situation in Haiti had become more ambiguous and less

predictable. In order to maintain maximum flexibility, the JCS directed USACOM to develop a third plan, merging OPLANs 2370 and 2380 to response to the uncertain situation in Haiti. The resulting OPLAN was 2375, a compromise of forced entry and permissive entry operations. As planners worked feverishly on the plan, units began preparation for the "intervasion" (Kretchik 1998, 69).

As units prepared for Operation Uphold Democracy, a negotiation team comprising of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, retired General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn arrived in Port-au-Prince on 17 September 1994. The team's mission was to negotiate a peaceful negotiation to the crisis. On 18 September 1994, units of JTF 180 under the command of XVIIIth Airborne Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Henry Hugh Shelton, departed from key locations abroad the continental United States and the Caribbean to execute OPLAN 2370. Negotiations continued as soldiers, marines, and airmen headed towards Haiti. H-hour was set for 190401Z September 1994. Miraculously, with H-hour only a few hours away, the Carter Team persuaded Cedras to reach an agreement that included the abdication of the Junta Government and the return of President Aristide by 15 October 1994. In return, Cedras would face an administrative landing instead of a forced entry by JTF 180 and receive safe exit for his family and staff. As a result of the agreement, President Clinton directed an abortion of the invasion. The conditions were now set for permissive entry operation (Kretchik 1998, 72).

The promiscuous situation on the ground forced planners to recommend a modified version of OPLAN 2380 coded OPLAN 2380 Plus. Lieutenant General Henry Shelton approved the plan in the early morning hours of 19 September 1994, the morning of the original D-Day. OPLAN 2380 Plus entailed a permissive entry of the Marine

Special Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) and the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division, with the 10th Mountain Division staff serving as the headquarters of JTF 190. This force was soon reinforced by the 2d Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division and a multinational force comprising of units from Bangladesh, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Caribbean Command (Kretchik 1998, 74).

JTF 190 began operations in earnest centering around the two major hubs of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. Initially, the 10th Mountain Division conducted limited patrolling in the major hubs while protecting key installations and troop bases. Apparently, the division leadership was slightly cautious based on its Somalia experience. Soon after, however, as the situation became clearer, the division rapidly expanded its operations to include out of sector missions and missions under Operation Mountain Strike to seize illegal weapons cache (Kretchik 1998, 48). As the JTF headquarters, the 10th Mountain Division also assumed duty as the multinational forces headquarters. Consequently, in addition to conducting current operations throughout Haiti, the division also had the mission of planning the reception, integration, and employment of multinational forces gradually entering the theater.

Over the next three months, the MNF and international civilian police task force maintained a stable and secure environment, allowing the government to focus on exercising its governing and legislative responsibilities. In December 1994, the 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain Division as the multinational forces headquarters.

The 25th Infantry Division received a warning order for eminent deployment to Haiti in November 1994. Unlike the 10th Mountain Division, the 25th Infantry Division

had adequate resources and external assistance to prepare for Haiti. The situation in November 1994 had become much clearer for U.S. forces operating in Haiti. As a result, combat training centers, the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS), as well as the CALL were prepared to assist the 25th Infantry Division with tactics, techniques, and procedures already successfully tested in Haiti. The most useful tool was a set of real world Haiti historical vignettes that CALL had produced. In addition to the vignettes, the 25th Infantry Division had access to the 7th Army Training Center (ATC) white paper and the USAIS OOTW Close Quarter Combat Training Support Packet.

Throughout the division, units executed training using these resources as guides to formulate training scenarios and STXs. Training methodology was similar from one battalion to the next. Units generally began training with individual training, followed by collective STX training and livefire exercises. Naturally, units integrated the theater rules of engagement (ROE) and the graduated response sequence into every phase and level of training. An added bonus was 2d Brigade's participation in JRTC Rotation 9-94, a special peace enforcement rotation. The invaluable experience the brigade had drawn several months earlier at the JRTC gave it a tremendous edge in preparing for Haiti. The second added bonus was the assistance the JRTC and CALL provided to units across the division. Both agencies provided O/Cs and subject matter experts (SMEs) during the division Haiti trainup. Consequently, the 25th Infantry Division was exceptionally prepared for Haiti.

In late December, the 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain as the multinational forces headquarters in Haiti. The Division deployed two infantry brigades, with the 2d Brigade into Port-au-Prince and the 3d Brigade Cap Haitien. From these

major hubs, the brigades along with multinational forces contingents and elements form JSOTF conducted operations throughout Haiti. The missions included fixed site security, quick reaction force, presence patrolling, convoy/VIP escort, operate checkpoints, and cordon and search. Thorough predeployment training allowed the 25th Infantry Division to achieve remarkable success in its primary mission of establishing a secure and stable environment conducive to promoting democracy in Haiti.

In three months, the 25th Infantry Division was able to establish a secure and environment in Haiti. This environment allowed the Haitian leadership to focus solely on its governing and legislative duties, without fear of violent reprisals from armed thugs.

In March 1995, the 25th Infantry Division conducted relief in place with multinational forces under the command of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Following UNMIH, the UN Security Council directed the continuation of the mission in Haiti with a reduced force structure. United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) and United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) followed UNMIH. In December 1997, the United Nations mission in Haiti evolved into the United Nations International Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). MIPONUH officially marked the end of military missions in Haiti.

Operation Joint Endeavor

In 1995, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina had deteriorated beyond hope. By early 1995, the United Nations "safe havens" within Bosnia-Herzegovina was at risk of becoming encircled by Serbian forces. In response to the eminent crisis, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) alerted 3-325th ABCT. This battalion size task force was the EUCOM rapid reaction force, a subordinate command of the Southern European Task

Force (SETAF). The 3-325th ABCT had the capability to conduct forced entry operation anywhere in theater within eighteen hours of notification. Additionally, the 3-325th ABCT was the U.S. representative in the NATO's Allied Mobile Force (AMF).

By March 1995, the 3-325th ABCT had trained to standard all of its METL in two separate field exercises, each over forty days long encompassing the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels and livefire exercises at Grafenwoehr. The ABCT was superbly prepared to face any threat in theater. In June, the ABCT received an alert order from EUCOM to conduct an extraction of encircled UN forces operating as part of United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in Srebrenica or Gorazda (Scaparrotti 1998, 4).

In order to prepare for this highly complex mission, the ABCT again deployed to Grafenwoehr. At Grafenwoehr, the ABCT conducted four full rehearsals, including two night rehearsals. The rehearsals were also external evaluations conducted by Headquarters, V Corps. By the end of the exercise, each company team in the ABCT had performed actions on the objective and extraction twenty-four times, including night livefire conditions with Apache gunships and AC-130 providing close air support. Upon completion of training, the ABCT returned to its homebase in Vicenza, Italy to wait for an execute order (Scaparrotti 1998, 5). The execute order did not come.

In August 1995, EUCOM again alerted the ABCT for possible extraction of UNPROFOR forces. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina had become hopelessly incurable and UNPROFOR forces seemingly were clinging on for the final onslaught. The ABCT returned to Hohenfels and conducted proficiency training in its mission essential tasks. Once again, the execute order did not come. The 3-325th ABCT was

now, however, one of the most combat ready units in the U.S. Army, having engaged in the most intensive training period possible by any infantry unit.

The call finally came in October 1995 for the 3-325th ABCT to deploy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The former warring factions had reached a peace agreement in Ohio under the Dayton Peace Accord with assistance from the international community under U.S. leadership. The original concept for deployment entailed the initial deployment by 3-325th ABCT under the SETAF Headquarters as TF Lion. The ABCT was to secure Tuzla Airbase and conduct operations in the U.S. sector to enforce measures of the Dayton Peace Accord until relieved by the Task Force Eagle (1st Armored Division), the implementation force (IFOR). However, detailed analysis of the operation revealed the complexity of the command and control, logistics, and communications under the concept of a two task force concept. As a result, by the time of execution, 3-325th ABCT became an attached unit of Task Force Eagle (Scaparrotti 1998, 7).

In late November, LTC Curtis Scaparrotti, the 3-325th ABCT Commander, along with the Task Force Eagle leadership conducted a reconnaissance of Tuzla Airbase and the U.S. sector in the vicinity. The seven-day reconnaissance provided LTC Scaparrotti great insight on the situation on the ground and allowed him to coordinate the relief in place with UNPROFOR commanders as well as support units in the Tuzla Airbase. The study of the ground also gave LTC Scaparrotti valuable intelligence to effectively formulate a concept for basecamp security as well as operations in sector (Scaparrotti 1998, 17).

At the same time, soldiers and leaders of the 3-325th ABCT continued predeployment training at homestation. Individual training consisted of mine awareness

and ROE training, in addition to numerous other tasks. By late November, the ABCT transitioned to collective training. The collective training comprised of platoon level STX lanes both mounted and dismounted. The STXs created challenging situations for the platoon leadership and soldiers alike. Lane scenarios ranged from react to mine strike to belligerent checkpoints, and included react to sniper in built-up area. The one common recurring theme among the lanes was the application of the theater ROE. This theme allowed soldiers to face situations they were likely to encounter in Bosnia-Herzegovina and respond appropriately using the ROE. By early December, the 3-325th ABCT had completed focused training and was prepared to deploy into Bosnia-Herzegovina (Scaparrotti 1998, 19).

On 6 December 1995 the battalion staff issued the order to the company commanders. The mission statement was "On order, 3-325th ABCT inserts by air to secure Tuzla Air Base in support of Task Force Eagle peace enforcement operations." The keys to success as per LTC Scaparrotti's commander's intent statement included force protection, soldier discipline, strict impartiality, freedom of movement, and the ability to dominate any situation (Scaparrotti 1998, 20). Over the next few days, the task force conducted detailed rehearsals and prepared equipment and supplies for deployment Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Task Force Eagle and Operation Joint Endeavor.

The 3-325th ABCT received the execute order on 14 December, with the directed G-day of 15 December. In the afternoon of 14 December, units began departing Vicenza for the departure airfield in Aviano, Italy. At Aviano, the unit learned that poor weather was going to delay G-day from the original planned date of 15 December. When the weather finally cleared on 18 December, the battalion found itself with only about 50

percent of lift asset it had planned for. What ensued was a true test of flexibility. Over the next eight days, instead of four the staff had planned for, the task force deployed forces into theater from Aviano. The heavy package went into Tuzla on day one and two to provide essential combat power for the security of the airbase. This package included two rifle company teams, the battalion assault command post, one heavy weapons platoon, three 105mm howitzers, one scout sniper team, and one advanced trauma life support team (ATLS). The third rifle company, along with the howitzer battery (-), the heavy weapons company (-), and support elements flowed into Tuzla Airbase the following days (Scaparrotti 1998, 25).

The lead units of the 3-325th ABCT arrived at Tuzla Airbase on 18 December. As planned, elements of 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group conducted a linkup with the assault command post and provided guides to task force units to ensure smooth linkup with UNPROFOR security forces. Units jointly occupied UNPROFOR security positions and over the next few days performed joint patrols with UNPROFOR units. Additionally, soldiers and engineers worked feverishly to improve the force protection posture within the compounds (Scaparrotti 1998, 29). Even though the weather had caused delays in the arrival of 3-325th ABCT units, the directed transfer of authority (TOA) date between UNPROFOR and Task Force Eagle remained unchanged as 20 December 1995. At exactly 0600 hour on 20 December, 3-325th ABCT assumed full responsibility for Tuzla Airbase and immediately began patrolling the surrounding U.S. sector (Scaparrotti 1998, 31).

Christmas Eve 1995 marked a memorable day for the 3-325th ABCT. Business was as usual for soldiers in the task force, however, for the local inhabitants in the areas

surrounding Tuzla it was time for the traditional celebratory "Shlivovitz" fire. Strayed gunfire skipped across the entire security perimeter. In two instances, a car full of men accelerated toward manned security positions at the gate, stopped, and then one individual got out and fired a pistol into the air. In both cases, the soldiers exercised restraint by not firing and the incidences remained uneventful (Scaparrotti 1998, 35).

Another major event also occurred during Christmas Eve. A UH60 Black Hawk Helicopter carrying NATO and IFOR officials performed an emergency landing in a field just forward of one of the factions' lines in the town of Banja Luka. In response to the crisis, 3-325th ABCT deployed the quick reaction force (QRF) to secure the aircraft and crews. The QRF conducted an air movement by UH 60 helicopters within one hour of notification. The QRF commander, upon arrival, contacted the warring factions in the area and immediately had his forces secure the aircraft. Over the next two days, poor weather made the extraction of the QRF and aircraft impossible. Bosnians in the area offered their homes to soldiers to escape the cold. On day three, a brief clearing in the weather allowed for the extraction of soldiers, crew, and aircraft. The mission was a success and without incident (Scaparrotti 1998, 36).

In the remaining days of 1995, the soldiers of 3-325th ABCT conducted patrols and basecamp security while receiving the lead units of the 1st Armored Division. The new year arrived with a great surprise. The ABCT received an order from Task Force Eagle to assume responsibility for the Russian sector to ensure warring factions compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord D+30 requirements. The Russian Brigade was apparently delayed and not expected to be in sector until February (Scaparrotti 1998, 39).

In order to accomplish this mission, the 3-325th ABCT had to enforce the D+30 requirements in the sector. This meant that by 19 January 1996 all of the warring factions had to evacuate from the zone of separation (ZOS), declare all heavy weapons and consolidate them at designated weapons storage sites (WSS). As the staff began planning the operation, LTC Scaparrotti conducted a reconnaissance of the sector. Upon completion of the reconnaissance, the staff finalized the plan and gained approval of the plan from Task Force Eagle (Scaparrotti 1998, 40).

On January 1996, LTC Scaparrotti departed Tuzla for Lopare with a force consisting of an engineer platoon, a reinforced heavy weapons platoon, a tactical air control party, an advanced trauma life support team, and the ABCT alternate command post. The concept of operation was to meet with warring factions leaders to coordinate D+30 compliance measures and gain their assistance for the mine clearance of the major roads in the ZOS. The ABCT executed the operation as planned. The cleared roads facilitated the evacuation of warring factions forces. By 19 January, the last warring factions forces departed the ZOS in the Russian sector without incident. The 3-325th ABCT engineer platoon, in compliance with the D+30 requirements, destroyed any remaining heavy weapons in the ZOS. Over the next few weeks, the 3-325th ABCT conducted patrols to ensure warring factions compliance. Despite a few violations of the D+30 agreements, the operation lasted the entire month of January without incident. On January 1st and 2nd, the 3-325th ABCT conducted relief in place with the Russian Airborne Brigade and relinquished responsibility of the sector to the Russians (Scaparrotti 1998, 49).

Shortly upon turning the sector over to the Russians, the ABCT received a redeployment fragmentation order (FRAGO) from U.S. Army Europe Headquarters directing the task force's redeployment back to its homebase in Vicenza, Italy. The ABCT, along with a marine expeditionary unit (MEU), formed the EUCOM Rapid Deployment Force, and therefore could not be deployed for an extended period without the risk to other contingency operations. Consequently, the ABCT began redeploying non-essential units immediately and by 19 February, had completed a relief in place with Task Force Striker. As units completed the relief in place, they departed Tuzla for the intermediate staging base (ISB) in Taszar, Hungary. On 4 March, the last units from the ABCT arrived back home in Vicenza (Scaparrotti 1998, 56).

During the period of approximately two and a half months, the 3-325th ABCT executed a peace enforcement operation with remarkable success. The unit conducted over 1,400 patrols and played a major role in the successful introduction of U.S. forces into theater. Additionally, the unit performed numerous challenging operations without incident or cost to soldiers' lives. Major General Nash, the commander of Task Force Eagle and 1st Armored Division, summed it up well at a staff meeting the night before the departure of the 3-325th ABCT. He acknowledged that at first he did not know what he would do with an airborne battalion combat team in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but now he does not know what to do without one (Scaparrotti 1998, 57).

Analysis of Mission Effectiveness

It is arguably feasible to declare all three operations effective, however, many more other factors have significant bearing on success beyond perceived mission accomplishment. The 10th Mountain Division in Operation Restore Hope established

conditions that allowed humanitarian Relief Agencies to operate freely, bringing an end to the food shortage crisis in Somalia in 1993. In 1995, the division brought a secure and stable environment to Haiti that allowed the Haitian Government to exercise its legislative and governing responsibilities. The 25th Infantry Division followed the 10th Mountain Division into Haiti and continued this legacy of success. Following the same pattern, the 3-325th ABCT entered the Bosnia-Herzegovina as the first element of Task Force Eagle. Within two and a half months of operation, the 3-325th ABCT achieved remarkable success. Its achievements included securing the Tuzla Airbase to facilitate the rapid build up of U.S. forces, enforcement of the Dayton Peace Accord D+30 agreements in the Russian sector, and performed over 1,400 patrols. Overall, the units have accomplished what their higher headquarters had asked them to do, but the degree of success varies from one operation to the next.

In OOTW, success depends on other equally important factors besides mission accomplishment of the tasks assigned by higher headquarters. In most cases OOTW merely complement other instruments of national power. As a result, political considerations are the factors that govern OOTW and the military is normally a supporting effort. Hence, tactical prowess by a unit on the ground is not the only factor in determining how effective the unit had been. Instead, success depends on factors such as impartiality, legitimacy, and restraint. Consequently, one of the methods of measuring true success in operations other than war is to look at the Principles of OOTW inherent in U.S. Army and joint doctrine.

There are six principles of OOTW in accordance with Joint Publication 3-07. These principles are paraphrased from JP3-07 as follows:

1. Objective. In accordance with Joint Publication 3-07, commanders must direct all military operations toward a clearly defined and attainable objective. It is critical that commanders understand the strategic aims and political objectives in setting their own objectives for the operation and specifying the desired endstate. When military objectives do not support political objectives, the legitimacy of the mission may be at risk.

2. Unity of Effort. This principle involves directing all efforts toward a common purpose. In an OOTW environment, unity of effort, in addition to U.S. and multinational military forces, includes governmental and non-governmental agencies. In this environment, consensus building normally leads to success.

3. Security. This principle comes from the principles of war. In the context of OOTW, security means to deny hostile forces to acquire military political or informational advantage. This means retaining the freedom of maneuver and protecting the force. Security also includes exercising operational security to protect critical information. In some cases, dependent on the scope of the operation and degree of threat, missions may require protecting civilians or participating agencies, including non-governmental agencies, private volunteer organizations, and governmental agencies.

4. Restraint. In OOTW the prudent application of force is highly important since a single act can potentially jeopardize military and political objectives. Excessive force can also negatively impact the mission's legitimacy, and in most cases, place the unit's neutrality at risk.

5. Perseverance. This means to be prepared for prolonged operations in order to support strategic aims. In most OOTW, the proximate causes of conflict or friction are

difficult to determine. Assessment of the true causes may take some time and possibly cause the shifting of political objectives, and therefore military objectives.

6. Legitimacy. Where and when applicable, military forces must strive to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and government. Legitimacy involves the perception of morality, legality, and righteousness of actions performed by units or troops participating in the operation. The target audience may be one or all of the following: belligerents, warring factions, U.S. and international public, host nations, and local inhabitants. Since political objectives drive military actions in OOTW, in most cases, the success of an operation hinges on its legitimacy.

Measuring success in OOTW is extremely difficult. There are no set standards to measure a unit's effectiveness during OOTW. Consequently, the following model (table 3) measures the units' effectiveness qualitatively, based on the case studies and author's OOTW experience. The model of course evolves around the six Principles of OOTW. The author characterizes the degree of effectiveness into effective and ineffective. In this model, effectiveness does not equate to number of patrols, tactical prowess, or lack of casualties. Effectiveness pertains to how units' actions positively impact on the entire operation. On the other hand, ineffectiveness equates to how units' actions or inaction negatively impacted on the overall mission.

The 10th Mountain was undoubtedly effective at the tactical level during Operation Restore Hope. The Division had a clear objective of providing the conditions to allow efficient and safe passage of humanitarian relief convoys. The division focused primarily on getting humanitarian relief supplies to distribution sites. All periphery missions of subordinate units centered around this division focus. The division also

effectively integrated some of its combat multipliers such as civil affairs and psychological operations assets in concert with combat units to gain cooperation of local inhabitants. This effort partially accounted for unimpeded movement through some relief sectors in Somalia. In approximately thirty days, the division had dominated the situation in Somalia allowing humanitarian relief organizations to declare an end to the food shortage crisis in Somalia. The success clearly demonstrated effective application of the principle of objective.

Table 3. Operation Restore Hope--10th Mountain Division Effectiveness

PRINCIPLES OF OOTW	ANALYSIS	DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS
OBJECTIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focused on humanitarian relief • Military operations evolved around ensuring relief convoy security • Objective of ensuring humanitarian relief attained by January 1993 	EFFECTIVE
SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force protection excellent • Effectively secured 14,000 relief convoys • Fixed site security outstanding 	EFFECTIVE
LEGITIMACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International and U.S. public support • Marginal in gaining legitimacy from Somalis due to combat nature of operations • Aggressive cordon and search alienated populous 	INEFFECTIVE
RESTRAINT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appropriate restraint in exercising ROE • Aggressive cordon and search in many cases were nondiscriminate • Creating the perception of everyone is bad until proven otherwise 	INEFFECTIVE
UNITY OF EFFORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly effective in coordinating efforts with humanitarian relief agencies 	EFFECTIVE
PERSEVERENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolute determination to continue the mission until an endstate is met 	EFFECTIVE

Force protection was also effective. The division was able to protect itself, and in addition, secured countless humanitarian convoys and food distribution centers.

Subordinate units improved basecamp survivability with engineer effort and employ patrols to limit belligerent freedom of movement. Individual soldiers took appropriate measures to protect themselves on patrols and escort missions. The cumulative effect was superb force protection across the division sector. In addition, the division extended force protection measures to protect humanitarian relief convoys and distribution centers. The result was a high degree of effectiveness applying the principle of security.

The division, however, was less effective in some of the other areas. Throughout the operation, the division conducted aggressive cordon in search operations, sometimes spending several days going through a town. While these operations were efficient at the tactical level, the manner that they were executed politically alienated many Somalis. The need to have an enemy was evident during these operations. As a matter of fact, one Marine Corps general in Somalia saw the "need to have an enemy" as a fatal flaw in the military approach (Yates 1997, 5). Granted that the situation in Somalia was unstable and armed factions posed a great threat to U.S. forces, the combat approach to every operation negatively impacted U.S. forces' neutrality, and therefore the principles of restraint and legitimacy. Even though the 10th Mountain Division succeeded in accomplishing its mission of setting the conditions for humanitarian relief, its combat approach to the operation indirectly contributed to the disastrous U.S. approach of "isolate, marginalize, and minimize" General Mohammed Farrah Aideed. This fatal approach led to the 3 October 1995 firefight at Mogadishu where the lives of eighteen Rangers and Special

Forces soldiers were lost (Yates 1997, 5). As a result, the 10th Mountain Division proved ineffective at employing the principle of restraint and legitimacy.

The division on the other hand worked superbly with humanitarian relief agencies to coordinate relief efforts. The division established a civil-military operation center (CMOC) to orchestrate coordination efforts between units and humanitarian relief agencies. This enhanced the flow of supplies and strengthened the cooperation between military units and NGOs. The result demonstrated effective application of the principle of unity of effort.

The division was also effective in applying the principle of perseverance. The division displayed resolve for long term commitment by establishing support structure capable of sustained operations.

The 10th Mountain also performed effectively at the tactical level during Operation Uphold Democracy. As a lead unit on the ground, the division had the mission to establish a secure and stable environment, establish the conditions for fair and free elections, and transition to UNMIH. Table 4 measures the division's effectiveness during Operation Uphold Democracy based on the principles of OOTW.

The division's 2d Brigade conducted an air assault operation into Port-au-Prince International Airport and established security for the transfer of authority from the renegade regime of General Raoul Cedras to the legitimate government of President Jean Bertrand Aristide. The brigade immediately secured troop locations and improved their positions. Undoubtedly, the brigade had outstanding force protection. In addition to the physical bearers, leaders prevented soldiers from interacting with Haitians. The general rules included no fraternization with Haitians. Fixated with the "Somalia Syndrome," the

brigade focused all of its effort on force protection and was slow to gain the initiative elsewhere. Brigade operations consisted of reconnaissance and security patrols in the vicinity of the basecamps. The lack of initiative allowed organized supporters to continue the political killings sponsored by the Cedras Regime during the first few weeks of the operation. Consequently, even with overwhelming international support, the legitimacy of the mission was at risk because of the unit's failure to immediately stabilize the situation (Kretchik 1997, 108).

Table 4. Operation Uphold Democracy--10th Mountain Division Effectiveness

PRINCIPLES OF OOTW	ANALYSIS	DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS
OBJECTIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Established a stable and secure environment to allow the government of Haiti to execute its legislative responsibilities. Established the conditions for free and fair elections. Set the conditions for the transition of UN forces. 	EFFECTIVE
SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outstanding force protection measures. Excellent OPSEC. 	EFFECTIVE
LEGITIMACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to quickly take control of the situation in the first week of the operation allowed Cedras' thugs the freedom of maneuver in exercising its retribution agenda. Treatment of "belligerents" marginal; causing public alienation of individuals suspected but cleared of wrong doings. The "Somalia Syndrome" of treating everyone as a belligerent. 	INEFFECTIVE
RESTRAINT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aggressive cordon and search demonstrated excessive use of force. 	INEFFECTIVE
UNITY OF EFFORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outstanding as the multinational force headquarters in focusing force towards a common purpose. Worked well with non-governmental agencies. 	EFFECTIVE
PERSEVERENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intent on accomplishing mission through a long haul. 	EFFECTIVE

In addition to legitimacy, the brigade also violated the principle of restraint. During the following weeks, after much prodding from its parent XVIIIth Airborne Corps, the division began a series of cordon and search operation code named "Operation Mountain Strike." During these operations, divisional units utilized the same combat approach it had used in Somalia. Again "the need to have an enemy" was evident in these operations. In some cases, the aggressive nature of the cordon and search caused the Haitian populous to turn against the "old regime sympathizers." The result was looting of the suspects' home and bodily harm. Nevertheless, over ninety percent of the searches turned up no contrabands or weapons (Kretchik 1997, 103).

On the other hand the division performed outstandingly as the multinational forces headquarters. During the first few weeks the division was responsible for reception and integration of multinational forces. The division planned for the employment of these units to achieve the principle of unity of effort. Additionally, the division was postured to carry the mission through transfer of authority to UNMIH forces, effectively exercising the principle of perseverance. Unfortunately, perseverance alone did not preclude FORSCOM from replacing the unit with the 25th Infantry Division because of lack of overall effectiveness.

The 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain Division in December 1995. Its mission was clear and definable. The division's mission was to establish a secure and stable environment, create conditions for a fair and free elections, and facilitate the transition from multinational forces operation to UNMIH. The division deployed two brigades, one into Port-au-Prince and the other into Cap Haitien and

immediately began operations in sector. Table 5 measures the division's effectiveness during this operation.

Infantry battalions from the 25th Infantry Division performed essentially the same missions that the battalions of the 10th Mountain had performed. The missions included fixed site security, patrolling, convoy escort, VIP security, and quick reaction force. The biggest difference between the units of these two divisions was the way the units performed the missions. Unlike the 10th Mountain Division, units of the 25th Infantry Division continually interacted with the Haitian populous and local officials. The 25th Infantry Division units were active in engaging the population, quickly reinforcing the neutrality and legitimacy of the operation. By designing a tailored approach to the same mission executed by its predecessor, the 25th Infantry Division gained tremendous support from the Haitian people and demonstrated effective application of the principle of legitimacy. Additionally, the units exercised appropriate restraint that prevented suspects from being a target of public alienation. In some cases, instead of forced entry, 25th Infantry Division units, depending on the situation and intelligence, would ask property owners to search their dwellings. This further reinforced legitimacy and earned the division tremendous cooperation from the Haitians.

Engaging the population did not prevent the units of the 25th Infantry Divisions from exercising outstanding force protection and effective application of the principle of security. Leaders adjusted force protection level based on threat. This concept allowed freedom of maneuver for subordinate units to continually engage the local inhabitants. The units were doing more without suffering any casualties. As the multinational force headquarters, the division also orchestrated all operations in theater to ensure unity of

effort. The division effectively received, integrated, and employed units from multiple nations. In addition, during its reign in Haiti, the division also assisted the International Civilian Police from training the new Haitian Police. The overall result was effective application of the principle of unity of effort.

Table 5. Operation Uphold Democracy--25th Infantry Division Effectiveness

PRINCIPLES OF OOTW	ANALYSIS	DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS
OBJECTIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission focused on establishing a secure and stable environment. • Transition of mission over to UNMIH. • Set conditions for free and fair elections in Haiti. 	EFFECTIVE
SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force Protection outstanding. • Enhanced security in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. 	EFFECTIVE
LEGITIMACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tailored tactics to situation. • Gained legitimacy through continuous interaction with people. • Mission approach demonstrated total neutrality. 	EFFECTIVE
RESTRAINT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exercised restraint in all operations, including cordon and search. 	EFFECTIVE
UNITY OF EFFORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely effective in working with Haitian IPSF, CIVPOL, and humanitarian agencies toward a common purpose. 	EFFECTIVE
PERSEVERENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolute determination to accomplish the endstate. 	EFFECTIVE

In three months, the 25th Infantry Division had established a secure and stable environment, the conditions for free and fair elections, and allowed the Haitian government to exercise its legislative responsibilities. In March 1996, the division conducted transfer of authority with UNMIH forces. This signified the division's resolve in completing the mission through its entirety. This resolve demonstrated effective application of the principle of perseverance. The division's success allowed a flawless

transition to UNMIH and allowed UNMIH forces to successfully assist Haiti in its first free and fair elections in decades.

The 3-325th ABCT was the lead unit of Task Force Eagle to enter the Bosnia-Herzegovina theater of operation. Its mission was clearly defined as secure Tuzla Airbase to allow buildup of US forces and enforce the Dayton Peace Accord. Upon arriving at Tuzla the task force immediately upgraded the force protection status within the compound. Within several days, the task force was conducting foot patrols into the Serbian villages in the U.S. sector, immediately establishing legitimacy of the operation in the area. On the same day, task force soldiers demonstrated exceptional restraint in dealing with a potentially deadly situation. During Christmas Eve, a carload of Serbian men accelerated towards the gate and stopped short. One man got out and fired a pistol into the air. This act occurred twice at two different posts. Even though U.S. soldiers could have fired back due to demonstrated hostile intent, the squad leaders chose to exercise restraint. Their decision prevented the escalation of hostility in the area and may have contributed to future negotiations with Serbian leaders in the area. Within the first few days of the operation, the ABCT demonstrated effective application of the principles of legitimacy, security, and restraint.

Shortly following Christmas, the task force received the mission of enforcing the D+30 agreements of the Dayton Peace Accord within the Russian sector. The Russians apparently were delayed and therefore unable to occupy their sector at the designated time. The task force commander, Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Scaparrotti, and his staff quickly formulated a plan to enforce the D+30 agreements. Working with both Serbian and Muslim forces simultaneously, LTC Scaparrotti worked out the details of the

extraction of forces from the ZOS and the storage of heavy weapons. In addition, he also convinced both factions to clear major roads in sector that had been mined since the start of the war. LTC Scaparrotti's effort demonstrated effective application of the principles of unity of effort, objective, and perseverance. As a result, warring factions forces complied with the D+30 requirements with minor infractions and no shots fired or casualties.

Table 6. Operation Joint Endeavor--3-325th ABCT Effectiveness

PRINCIPLES OF OOTW	ANALYSIS	DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS
OBJECTIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secured Tuzla Airbase to allow buildup of U.S. combat power. Enforced the Dayton Peace Accord D+30 Agreements. 	EFFECTIVE
SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exercised outstanding force protection. Improved security posture of Tuzla Airbase upon transfer of authority from UNPROFOR forces. 	EFFECTIVE
LEGITIMACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Immediately established presence in U.S. sector. Demonstrated unquestionable neutrality during Russian sector D+30 Agreement mediation and ZOS enforcement. 	EFFECTIVE
RESTRAINT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exercised appropriate restraint under hostile situation. Demonstrated excellent restraint during force application missions such as QRF. 	EFFECTIVE
UNITY OF EFFORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Worked well with warring factions to enforce the Dayton Accord as well as gained mutual cooperation from Serbian and BIH commanders alike. 	EFFECTIVE
PERSEVERENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resolve in Achieving Endstate 	EFFECTIVE

Upon successful completion of the ZOS enforcement operation, the ABCT received a FRAGO from USAREUR to immediately redeploy to its homebase in

Vicenza, Italy. The ABCT was the EUCOM rapid reaction force as well as the US representative of NATO's allied mobile force. Within the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), other contingency operations were heating up, warranting the recall of the ABCT. Within two and a half months, the ABCT performed its mission admirably and directly contributed to the success of Task Force Eagle.

A comparison of units' performance in table 7 illustrates that the 25th Infantry Division units and the 3-325th ABCT were more effective than the 10th Mountain Division units throughout both Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy. Assuming that all the infantry battalions in these units are equally trained. The only variation may lie in training focus and methodology.

In order to look at variation in training focus, the author compared the METL of the infantry battalions involved in these operations.

Table 8 clearly shows the difference in METL between the units. However, the combat tasks are generally the same or very similar. The discernable difference is the two OOTW tasks contained in 3-325th ABCT's METL. In an interview with LTC Scaparrotti, he indicated that the task of Separate Belligerents was a USAREUR directive. while Conduct Deterrent Operations was a task that NATO had directed for its allied mobile force contingents. A close examination of the performance measures of the battalion task of Separate Belligerents from the 7th ATC White Paper titled *Mission Training Plan for Stability Operations* indicates that the majority of the supporting tasks were combat-oriented tasks. The remaining tasks, such as negotiate with belligerents and liaise with local authorities, are presumably leaders tasks. LTC Scaparrotti added that in order to maintain proficiency in the two OOTW METL tasks, he designed an officer

Table 7. Relative Comparison of Units' Success

PRINCIPLES OF OOTW	OPERATION RESTORE HOPE 10th MTN	OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 10th MTN	OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 25th ID	OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR 3-325th ABCT
OBJECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE
SECURITY	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE
LEGITIMACY	INEFFECTIVE	INEFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE
RESTRAINT	INEFFECTIVE	INEFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE
UNITY OF EFFORT	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE
PERSEVERENCE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE	EFFECTIVE

Table 8. Unit METL Crosswalk

METL	10th MTN 3-14 IN	25th ID 4-87 IN	3-325th ABCT
Execute RSOP	+	+	+
Perform Airborne Assault/Airfield Seizure			+
Conduct NEO	+	+	+
Perform Air Assault	+		+
Move Tactically			+
Perform MTC	+	+	+
Attack	+	+	+
Defend	+	+	+
Separate Belligerents			+
Conduct Deterrent Operations			+

development program (OPD) to fill the need and incorporated platoon and squad critical tasks that were not inherent to the other METL tasks into training scenarios as time

permitted (COL Curtis M. Scaparrotti, interview by author, electronic mail, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 1999).

Since the variation in METL does not suggest contribution to effectiveness, let us examine the units' training methodology. The research shows that prior to Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy, the 10th Mountain Division focused mainly on combat tasks. Infantry battalions conducted numerous combined arms livefire to include the use of AC-130 Spectre Gunship (Kretchik 1998, 107). The 25th Infantry Division also conducted livefire training, but the focus was on graduated response. The major focus for the division's trainup was STX lanes. These lanes provided leaders and soldiers challenging situations that they would most likely face in Haiti. Similar to the 25th Infantry Division, the 3-325th ABCT also focused on Bosnia STX lanes, using the ROE as a guide for execution. In both of the latter cases, focused training and understanding of the environment gave the units a significant edge over units of the 10th Mountain Division and resulted in a higher degree of mission effectiveness.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter summarizes research findings, provides recommendations based on the findings, and identifies areas requiring additional research. The chapter provides answers to the primary research question and the subordinate questions through detailed analysis of case studies involving U.S. light infantry battalions.

The major findings of this research encompass the areas of training and preparation for OOTW. In the area of training, the author found that battle focus training provides the foundation necessary for successful execution of tactical missions inherent to OOTW. On the other hand, the author also found that, in addition to battle focused training units must prepare leaders and staff to face the leader-intensive OOTW environment. This means that units must train OOTW at the leader and staff level during its regular training regimen to ensure successful mission execution when called to duty. The second major finding is the need for focused predeployment training. The case studies substantially prove that units that conducted mission focused predeployment training performed far better than those that focused primarily on only combat tasks.

This chapter also provides recommendations for future training. Using the 25th Infantry Division predeployment training methodology for Haiti and the JRTC training model, the author provides recommendation on how to train units for both OOTW and war. In addition, the author also includes a recommended list of high payoff leader tasks that could be integrated into units' regular training cycle.

Finally, the author proposes a series of related topics requiring additional research. Key areas include the training of heavy divisions that entails realistic combat training as well as the OOTW environment inherent in any conflict, post-deployment training for units deployed to an OOTW mission, and how divisions effectively prepare and exercises slice integration for OOTW.

Findings

Light infantry battalions effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW through battle focused training, leader training, and effective predeployment training. The author's interview results indicate that the unanimous consensus among interviewees, which have served in command positions in OOTW, is that the best units to execute an OOTW mission is a disciplined, highly trained, cohesive combat unit. Additionally, results from this study clearly illustrate that combat ready units with focused predeployment training performed significantly better in OOTW than combat ready units without adequate predeployment training.

The primary key to success is battle focused training. FM 25-101 defines battle focus as a "concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime tasks." These wartime tasks have an inherent set of supporting collective and individual tasks that must be accomplished to standard. This study found that the majority of inherent supporting collective and individual tasks in OOTW are duplicate tasks found in wartime tasks. In the case of 3-325th ABCT, when higher headquarters directed OOTW tasks, the study found that its OOTW METL tasks of Separate Belligerents and Conduct Deterrent Operations consisted largely of combat related tasks. The remaining tasks were largely critical leader tasks. As a result, COL Curtis Scaparrotti, then commander of the 3-325th

ABCT, chose to focus his battalion's training on wartime tasks and geared his OPD program around training the battalion leadership on the critical leader tasks inherent to the OOTW METL tasks. He also indicated in the interview that, when situation permitted, he integrated critical squad and platoon collective tasks, inherent to the battalion OOTW METL tasks but not otherwise trained, into the unit's training plan. His recommendation is the continual focus on warfighting tasks (COL Curtis M. Scaparrotti, interview by author, electronic mail, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 1999).

Brigadier General Charles Swannack, then commander 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, also echoed the need of focusing on wartime tasks and not to include additional OOTW METL tasks into the current light infantry battalion during his interview (BG Charles H. Swannack, interview by author, electronic mail, Fort Leavenworth KS, March 1999). Additionally, all seven interviewees participating in this study do not recommend the addition of OOTW tasks into units' current METL. Again, based on their experience, well-trained, disciplined units can rapidly transition to OOTW since most OOTW supporting collective, leader, and individual tasks mirror those inherent to wartime tasks. Nevertheless, these leaders also recognize the need to train leaders and staff on critical, high payoff OOTW tasks.

The results from this study support the fact that battle focused training is the key to success, however, while conducting METL focused training units can also capitalize on setting the conditions to train soldiers and leaders on OOTW type tasks without compromising the warfighting focus. JRTC model is one great training model to emulate. A typical airborne battalion, conducting a rotation at the JRTC, gets to train on selected METL tasks, as approved by its division commander, and at the same time gets exposed

to the reality of an uncertain low intensity conflict scenario that requires soldiers and leaders to be exposed to OOTW type tasks.

The unit begins the rotation by conducting a forced entry airborne assault into the country of Cortina to seize the flight landing strip (FLS) on Geronimo Airfield to allow the build-up of follow on forces. After defending the airhead line and expanding the lodgment, the battalion conducts offensive operations in zone. Unlike the pristine conditions of Sicily Drop Zone of Fort Bragg, Cortina presents many unique challenges to the battalion. While infantry companies conduct combat operations, usually movement to contact using the search and attack technique to destroy the Cortinian Liberation Front (CLF) forces, the battalion leadership faces the challenge of dealing with the local population of the towns within its area of operations while exercising its normal warfighting responsibilities. Depending on the effectiveness of the battalion a gain support from the populous, the situation may escalate into situations whereby the battalion must commit combat forces to perform cordon and search or movement control operations such as road blocks or checkpoints. These operations expose soldiers and leaders to OOTW type conditions, tasks and mental cognitive stressors.

The conditions in Cortina eventually deteriorate to a point whereby the hostile neighboring nation of Atlantica attacks into Cortina to support the CLF's insurgency, causing the battalion to transition to defensive operations against armored forces, supported by air and artillery. Upon defeating the enemy's offensive capabilities, the battalion conducts offensive operations to clear the zone to allow US forces to transition to offensive operations and restore the Atlantica-Cortina border. The battalion receives a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to attack to destroy remnants of CLF or Atlantan forces.

The objective is the town of Shughart Gordon, a town containing both hostile forces and innocent civilians. In a short eleven days, the battalion effectively trains selected METL tasks while tackling the challenging conditions of OOTW.

Units, particularly rapid deployment forces that do not have the time to conduct extensive predeployment training, can use the JRTC model to prepare for combat as well as OOTW. The obvious fact is that units cannot replicate the sophisticated scenario and support structure of the JRTC based on available resources. Nevertheless, units can adopt the training concept and conduct training within the constraints of their capabilities and resources. Based on the author's experience as an JRTC O/C and rifle company commander during the United Nations Mission in Haiti, setting the conditions for realistic battle focused training while exposing leaders and soldiers to OOTW conditions involves but not limited to the following:

1. Establish scenarios germane to real world situations, focusing on the unit's AOR if possible. Conditions must have civilians, factions, and ambiguity to create the appropriate battlefield friction. Unless a unit goes to Jupiter, there will be people, both good and bad, and dwellings.

2. Every training event should be based on some kind of ROE that governs the use of force. This is a reality in every operation. ROE will definitely assist in creating cognitive mental stressors.

3. Have a thinking OPFOR. The normal mistake is to have an OPFOR with so much latitude that it becomes a renegade element. The OPFOR must be under control and must act predictably within its doctrine, resources, and limitations. This requirement is extremely difficult.

4. Build in cognitive mental stressors, physical stress, and initiative oriented training into your plan. In war as well as OOTW, soldiers and leaders will endure tremendous stress and make sound decisions under that stress. It is critical to replicate those conditions and provide opportunities in your training to allow junior leaders to make decisions.

The second key to success is leader training. Interviews with key leaders, who have successfully led infantry units in OOTW, suggest leader training as a strategy to mitigate the challenges of OOTW since most battalion level collective OOTW tasks are leader intensive. The interview with BG Charles Swannack resulted in the identification of high payoff critical leader and individual tasks that commanders could use in developing leaders training program or incorporate into field exercises to enhance their battalion's ability to operate in an uncertain OOTW environment. Figure 11 lists those tasks identified by BG Swannack.

The third key to success is focused training. Success in OOTW extends beyond merely accomplishing the tasks assigned. It entails the manner in which participants accomplish the tasks and the social and political implications inherent to the tasks. Hence, tactical success does not always equate to mission effectiveness. It is critical for leaders and soldiers to acknowledge that the primacy of an OOTW is its political objectives. Consequently, in order to be effective in an OOTW environment, units must conduct focused predeployment training to gain the appropriate level of situational awareness. This predeployment training must replicate the situation and conditions the units are about to face.

In the cases of 25th Infantry Division and 3-325th ABCT, units focused on real world scenarios they would face in country. The training involved cognitive mental stressors and carefully evaluated by O/Cs or SMEs. The 25th Infantry Division actually had O/Cs and SMEs from JRTC and the USAIS assisting in their training. Variation in livefire exercises entailed selective engagement and graduated response while close quarters combat training involved techniques from the USAIS white paper on close quarters combat in OOTW. This focused training was one of the major contributing factors to these units' success.

The 10th Mountain Division, on the other hand, focused entirely on combat operations. The unit did not tailor its training to the situation on the ground. Instead the unit conducted livefire training, complete with artillery and close air support. While the training was probably conducive to the hostile environment in Somalia, it certainly missed the mark for Haiti. Additionally, this training approach also established a conditioned combat attitude in the soldiers involved. As a result, the 10th Mountain was less effective than desirable in Haiti. This finding supports the fact that, in addition to being combat ready, units must perform focused training tailored to the specific situation on the ground to be totally effective.

One of the training models that reflect focused predeployment training is the 25th Infantry Division training model. The model is a two-week training plan that focuses on STXs derived from real world vignettes. Phase one in the model is leader training, focusing on vignettes collected by CALL and worst case scenarios developed by the division after its leader reconnaissance in Haiti. Phase two is individual training. During this phase soldiers perform close quarter combat (CQC) training. This training also

entails target discrimination drills and reflexive shooting. The third phase consists of collective training. Collective training involves livefire training at the tire house and battle drill training on entering building and clearing rooms. Collective training culminates with platoon and company STXs focusing on the collective tasks that platoons and companies would be conducting in theater. These tasks include platoon fixed site security, platoon presence patrol, platoon convoy operations, and company cordon and search. Each STX concludes with an after action report facilitated by trained O/Cs. Figures 1 and 2 outline an actual 25th Infantry Division light infantry battalion training calendar during the Haiti train up.

DECEMBER 1994						
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
				1	2	3
Block Leave						
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Prep for Tag, Leader Tag, Vignette Discussions, Driver Tag						
Vehicle Prep, Load Scale, Inspect II Load CONEXs						
Block Leave						
11	12 POM Unit Claims Block Leave	13 Class: FLD Order Officer	14 Bu Run CIF Issue CDR Brief Bu FSG Brief Inspect II Load CONEXs	15 POM VEH LOAD CIF Issue Deploy Prep	16 Ldr Tag POM Veh in AHA Range Prep	17 Bu Holiday Ball
Leader Tag, Vignette Discussions						
18 LDR Tag (CQC)	19 Div Run POM Ldr Tag (CQC) Indiv Weapons: Zero/Qual	20 LDR Tag	21 Load Ro Ro HHC Convoy Opns Tag	22	23	24
		CQC Marksmanship		Tag Holiday		
25	26 Ro Ro Salls	27 POM M/U A: BD6 STX B: CQC (MAC) C: Tire House	28 A: CQC (MAC) B: Tire House C: BD6 STX	29 A: Tire House B: BD6 STX C: CQC (MAC)	30	31
Tag Holiday		STX Vignettes each day (Tire House, MAC, CTF)				
		Tag Holiday				

Figure 1. 4-87 IN Haiti Predeployment December Training Calendar

JANUARY 1995

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
1	2 FSG Brief	3 ADVON DEPARTS	4	5	6 ROE, Country Brief, Intel Update Force Protection, SAEDA, Prev Med, Hygiene	7
Training Holiday		PLT/CO STX, Junior Ldr Tng		Convoy STX (HHC)		
8	Classroom Relief in Place SOP Review ROE Review	9 RoRo Arrives	10	11 FSG Brief	12	13 Bn Tng Holiday
		Maritime Make-up Lifeguard Certification Final POM (SGLI, POA, Wills, etc) Close out Barracks, ROV Storage, RD Property Trans				14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Battalion Deployment Window						
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Figure 2. 4-87 IN Haiti Predeployment January Training Calendar

The findings support that in order to effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW, infantry battalions must continue to focus on its warfighting tasks. Additionally, units that conducted focused predeployment training performed far better. The findings also dissuade the notion of having U.S. peacekeeping battalions. Since the facts prove that units can effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW, coupled with the shrinking armed forces, there is no need to have peacekeeping battalions. This will only detract from our warfighting ability. Unless forgotten, the Army exists to fight our nation's war.

Table 9. High Payoff Leader Tasks

Conduct Negotiations
Liaise with Non-governmental Agencies
Liaise with Local Authorities
React to Media
Employ Escalation Sequence/Graduated Response
Conduct Mediation
Conduct Mixed Military Working Groups

Implications

One of the implications from this study is that command climate has tremendous influence on the way a unit operates. In the case of the 10th Mountain Division in Haiti, command influence may have precluded infantry battalion commanders from engaging the Haitian population. Additionally, a unit typically takes on the personality of its commander. If the commander's focus is solely combat operations, the soldiers and subordinate leaders across that unit will surely share the same focus. Consequently, the combat focus governs the soldiers' actions on the ground. Misapplication of the actions can lead to grave consequences in an OOTW environment.

The second implication is the apparent lack of leader OOTW training in some units. Granted that there are leaders that possess special diplomatic skills that would make them successful leaders in OOTW, most of the skills must be developed through time. The misapplication of tactics in the case studies suggests that the leaders were not trained to see the terrain, themselves, and the situation. On the other hand, the case studies also revealed that a brilliant commander with diplomatic skills can lead a unit to

success during OOTW since most of the OOTW tasks involve critical leader tasks coupled with collective combat related tasks.

Limitations

The key limitation is the lack of detailed written information on the battalions involved in Operation Restore Hope and Operation Uphold Democracy. The majority of information available in the CARL archives focused primarily on the divisions and brigades. As a result, the author had to make some assumptions in analyzing units' effectiveness. The key assumption is that the battalions enjoyed a certain degree of flexibility in mission execution. Hence, the battalions' effective or ineffective application of the principles of OOTW directly impacts the overall effectiveness of the brigades and divisions. Consequently, when brigades and divisions performed effectively or ineffectively, the author reflected the same results against their subordinate battalions during his analysis.

Recommended Additional Research

This study revealed the need for further research in several other areas relating to OOTW. The areas include leader training, staff training, brigade and division integration of slice assets, transition of heavy units to OOTW, and the transition of units from OOTW back to warfighting. Regardless of its lack popularity, OOTW will remain in our Army's future. To effectively perform in this dirty business, our leaders must tackle its challenges with the utmost zeal.

Leaders' training is one of the most important areas that must be researched. Some of the leader tasks are more obvious. Some of the redundant leader tasks found in this study include negotiation and liaison with NGOs. These critical tasks are vital to a

unit's success in OOTW and therefore must be integrated into its leaders training program.

A second area is staff training. The OOTW environment provides unique challenges for staff officers. The staff estimate process is the essentially the same as any other operation but the indicators to look for are different. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield as well as logistics requirements offer significant challenges to staff officers. Hence staff training is an area that warrants research. Regardless of the current warfighting focus, staff officers must be prepared to operate in an OOTW environment.

The third area that requires additional research is the slice integration from the brigade to division level. This ranges from civil affairs and psychological operations to information operations, among others. There is a myriad of tasks and planning considerations that must be part of the equation. The information is available through sources such as CALL and other professional publications, however, it is not coherently packaged under a single source. The added challenge is the command and control during OOTW. Since most OOTW missions involves a U.S. or UN led multinational forces, the command and control challenge nearly doubled.

The fourth area is how heavy units effectively transition from warfighting to OOTW. The last two major units to rotate through Bosnia were the 1st Cavalry Division and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Both of these units are heavy units. Due to different training requirements, primarily associated with gunnery and the way heavy units fight, mechanized units do not train the same way as light units. While light units generally are accustomed to the challenging OOTW elements in the like of the JRTC scenario, heavy units get very little exposure. Instead, the National Training Center

(NTC), the premier training center for heavy forces, primarily trains heavy units for mid and high intensity conflict. The NTC training scenario does not provide the heavy units with elements and conditions inherent in OOTW. As a result, heavy units may require longer transition time to include a mission rehearsal exercise prior to deployment into an OOTW environment.

The final area requiring research is how units effectively transition from an OOTW mission back to warfighting. This dilemma presents a significant challenge to units across the Army. A Rand Corp study indicates that an OOTW deployment seriously degrades units' combat readiness (X, RAND). Hence, ability for units to transition from a OOTW mission back to its' predeployment combat readiness warrants significant focus.

Appendix A

Interview Questionnaire

For Preparation of MMAS Thesis:

“How Can Light Infantry Battalion Effectively Transition from Warfighting to OOTW?”

1. State your name, rank, duty position at the time of the operation and briefly describe your unit's mission and concept.

2. What was your battalion METL at the time?

3. Did your battalion METL at the time contain peace operations type tasks (NEO and the like)? If it contained peace operations type tasks, what were the tasks and how or why these tasks were derived?

4. Did you have to adjust your METL for the operation?

5. How did your battalion prepare for the operation? Mission Rehearsal Exercise? Training?

6. Did the preparation adequately prepare your battalion for the operation? What significant problems and challenges did the battalion face? Please explain in detail.

7. If you have the chance to do the entire operation over, how would you adjust your training and preparation to address some of the problems and challenges your battalion faced during mission execution?

8. Now that you have executed a peace operation, would you adjust your current METL to include OOTW tasks? If so what task(s) would you add and why?

9. Based on your experience, the changing world, and the current threat, how should US light infantry battalions prepare for future operations? Is the current METL sufficient to allow forces to transition effectively to OOTW operations? Do they need to train for operations other than war or focus entirely on warfighting?

10. This question is reserved for any additional thoughts you may have on this research question or anything else you would like to address.

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